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Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on the High
Seas: A Legal and Policy Analysis
Claire P. Gutekunstt
In September 1981 President Reagan announced a policy of interdic-
tion of undocumented migrants on the high seas. The interdiction pro-
gram involves boarding vessels suspected of carrying illegal migrants,
questioning those aboard, and returning to their home country all per-
sons determined to lack valid entry documents or colorable claims to
refugee status. To date, the Reagan Administration has implemented the
program only with respect to Haitian migrants, although the policy as
announced was not limited to Haitians.
Interdiction underscores a basic ambiguity in the definition of a refu-
gee in domestic and international law. The ambiguity centers on the
point at which an individual, leaving one country and attempting to enter
another, attains refugee status with its attendant protections. The an-
nounced interdiction policy is based on the premise that whatever rights
people might have to leave their country, admission to another country
is not a right, but a privilege, which may be granted or denied by national
governments. This premise does not acknowledge the tension existing
between national sovereign rights and international principles governing
asylum, and thus the legal status of the interdiction policy is uncertain.
Because the United States is a leader in the development of interna-
tional law, and because it so frequently is the intended destination of
migrants, its policies and actions concerning immigration and refugees
can have impact far beyond individual cases and strictly national con-
cerns. They may affect the immigration policies of many other states
and, ultimately, the international treatment of refugees. For this reason,
it is important that the legal status of the U.S. interdiction policy be fully
examined in light of existing and developing international norms.
This Article traces the history of Haitian migration to the United
States in the context of political and economic conditions in Haiti. It
then examines international norms and United States laws governing ref-
ugee status and treatment. The Article next describes the interdiction
program and analyzes the issues it raises under international and domes-
tic law. Finally, the Article recommends that the interdiction program
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be terminated because of its potentially negative impact on prevailing
international norms and on the treatment of refugees by other states.
I. Haitian Migration
A. Conditions in Haiti
Haiti has been described as the poorest, most repressive country in the
western hemisphere.1 Under the regime of Francois "Papa Doe"
Duvalier, who ruled the country from 1957 to 1971, there was a consis-
tent pattern of documented human rights violations in Haiti. 2 Duvalier
established the Tonton Macoutes - the Haitian secret police - whose
members virtually rule the countryside. 3 His regime was marked by
graft and corruption, including widespread abuses of foreign aid, and by
the torture, exile, and banning of the political opposition. Most Haitian
intellectuals, professionals, and others seen as political threats fled the
country, were exiled, or were killed during this period.
4
Duvalier's son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doe" Duvalie, assumed power
upon his father's death in 1971. 5 Jean-Claude soon announced a "liberal-
ization," but his promise has not been, realized; Haiti remains an ex-
tremely repressive country ruled by an authoritarian government.
6
Although the Haitian Constitution purports to guarantee substantial
protection of individual civil rights,7 these freedoms are in practice effec-
1. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified
sub. nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Jerry De
Santillana, State Department Country Officer for Haiti); see also Taylor, Deciding How to Stop
the Haitians - And Why, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1981, at E4, col. 1.
2. See generally Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
701, 711-16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Immigration Reform Hearings] (prepared statement of
Dr. Alexander Stepick, Sociology Department, Florida International University) [hereinafter
cited as Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings]. Haiti's political history has been turbulent,
marked by "alternating periods of authoritarian rule and political instability." U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984, at 568 (1985)
(report on Haiti) [hereinafter cited as 1984 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS].
3. See Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 712 (origins of Tonton Macoutes),
716 (operation), 722-23, 732-33 (terror and lawlessness of countryside). The official title for the
Tonton Macoutes is Volunteers for National Security.
4. See 127 CONG. REc. H9330-31 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1981) (statement by Rep. Chisholm);
M. Hooper, Critique of the State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Haiti for
1980, at 15 (May 1981) (unpublished report of the Lawyers Committee for International
Human Rights [hereinafter cited as Lawyers Committee]).
5. See Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 717-44 (description of Hai-
tian conditions under Jean-Claude Duvalier's rule). Jean-Claude was eighteen years old when
he became President-for-Life.
6. See Haiti - Report of a Human Rights Mission: June 26-29, 1983 (unpublished report
of the Lawyers Committee, Americas Watch, and the International League for Human
Rights); 1984 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 2, at 568-69.
7. HArIAN CONSTrrUTION of 1983, title II, ch. IV, arts. 22-51.
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tively restricted by other laws. The President-for-Life has plenary pow-
ers during the nine months the legislature is not in session, and in the
past frequently has dissolved the legislature and suspended the
Constitution.8
Human rights abuses in Haiti persist. Members of the general popu-
lace, as well as political opponents of the Duvalier regime, face arbitrary
detention without arrest procedures or due process protections.9 Mem-
bers of the opposition Christian Democratic Party, including its Presi-
dent, Sylvio Claude, have been subjected to frequent harassment,
arbitrary detention, and beatings. 10 Persons suspected of involvement
with anti-government exile organizations, and others deemed disloyal to
the government, have been prosecuted."
Returnees to Haiti also have reason to fear for their safety. Despite
periodic official assertions that those returning from abroad would not be
harmed, returnees frequently have been tortured or imprisoned under in-
humane conditions. 12 Former Tonton Macoutes have testified that they
were under standing orders to arrest and imprison all returnees from the
United States, considered traitors for having left Haiti.
13
Repression and poverty reinforce each other in Haiti, the poorest na-
tion in the Western Hemisphere. 14 Three percent of the population con-
trols the bulk of the nation's wealth.15 Members of the ruling stratum
use their positions for personal enrichment, through taxation and extor-
tion of the populance and the diversion of foreign aid from its intended
8. See 1984 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 2, at 568; U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983, at 600 (1984) (re-
port on Haiti) [hereinafter cited as 1983 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS]; Lawyers Com-
mittee, Recent Violations of Human Rights in Haiti 10 (Feb. 1981) (unpublished report).
Article 79 of the HAITIAN CONSTITUTION of 1983 provides that under "grave" circumstances
the President may dissolve the legislature; however, there is no provision allowing for suspen-
sion of the Constitution itself.
9. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1984: HAM 164-67 (1984).
10. M. Hooper, Election 1984: Duvalier Style 4 (unpublished report of Americas Watch
and the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights in Haiti) (Mar. 1984). [hereinafter cited as
Election 1984].
11. 1983 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 8, at 602, 606; Election 1984,
supra note 10, at 9.
12. See Lawyers Committee, Violations of Human Rights in Haiti 45 (unpublished report
to the Organization of American States) (Nov. 1980) (treatment of returnees generally); Id. at
app. C1 (treatment of returnees from the United States); see also Stepick, Immigration Reform
Hearings, supra note 2, at 734-36 (treatment of returnees from the United States).
13. See Lawyers Committee, supra note 12, at app. C5 (affidavit of a former Tonton
Macoute); see also Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 735 (reporting
Macoute testimony about treatment of returnees).
14. 1984 STATE DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 2, at 576. Nearly eighty percent of
the rural population "exist in dire poverty." Id.
15. 127 CONG. REc., supra note 4.
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uses, relying on intensified repression to retain their official positions.16
Given such conditions it is hardly surprising that increasing numbers of
Haitians have sought to leave their homeland for both political and eco-
nomic reasons.
B. Haitian Migration to the United States
Large-scale migration of poor Haitians to the United States began in
1972.17 Prior to 1972, most departing Haitians migrated to the Baha-
mas. When the Bahamian government threatened them with deportation
in the late 1960's and early 1970's, they left the Bahamas for Miami; new
migrants headed by boat directly for the United States.', Beginning in
1978 the number of Haitian migrants increased dramatically. By the
summer of 1981, up to one thousand were being apprehended each
month;19 the INS estimated that an equal number entered undetected.
20
Forty to fifty thousand Haitians entered the United States illegally be-
tween 1972 and the occurrence of the first interdiction in October 1981,
according to these INS estimates.
21
Even though Haitians constituted less than two percent of illegal im-
migrants to the United States,22 their influx attracted considerable public
attention, in part because many arrived in south Florida at the same time
as the Mariel boatlift from Cuba. Between April 21 and October 10,
1980, approximately 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians were proc-
essed in south Florida.2 3 The Carter Administration gave these Cubans
and Haitians a special entrant status, which entitled them to certain
16. See Hooper, supra note 4, at 12, 16; Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note
2, at 723-26; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHT
PRAcTcEs FOR 1980, at 459, 461 (1981) (report on Haiti) [hereinafter cited as 1980 STATE
DEP'T COUNTRY REPORTS]; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of
American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti 74 (Dec. 13, 1979) (O.A.S.
Index OEA/Ser. I/V./11.46, doc. 66 rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as IACHR Report] ("Under
these conditions it is questionable whether badly needed foreign assistance programs effectively
reach their targets.").
17. Buchanan, Haitian Emigration: The Perspective from South Florida and Haiti at i
(unpublished report for U.S. Agency for International Development).
18. Id. at iv-v.
19. Taylor, supra note 1, at E4, col. 1.
20. Id.; Buchanan, supra note 17, at ii.
21. Taylor, supra note 1, at E4, cols. 2-3 (citing INS statistics).
22. Coast Guard Oversight-Part 2: Hearings on Military Readiness and International Pro-
grams Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) (testimony of David C. Hiller, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Coast Guard Hearings];
Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum from David Hiller to Members of the Presi.
dent's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy 2 (May 19, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Task Force Memorandum].
23. Masanz, Immigration: Undocumented Haitians 1 (Cong. Research Service, Library of
Cong., Feb. 8, 1982) (24,034 Haitians processed and paroled into the United States); Masanz,
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health and social service benefits. 24 The combined influx put great pres-
sure on health services, housing, and other social services in the Miami
area.25 The crime rate in the area rose dramatically, although observers
attributed little if any of the increase to the Haitians.26 Haitians also
encountered problems because they spoke Creole rather than the English
or Spanish spoken in Miami.27 Finally, at a time of rising unemploy-
ment, some Americans perceived them as competitors for unskilled labor
positions.
28
For all of these reasons, the federal government sought to end the in-
flux of Haitians, the migration of Cubans to south Florida having already
stopped. In part because the Cuban government had made clear that it
would not consider allowing any of its nationals to return at that time,
attention focused on the Haitians. The Reagan Administration began to
pressure the Haitian government to halt or at least minimize the influx of
its nationals. The Reagan Administration Task Force on Immigration
and Refugee Policy considered ways to expedite the return of Haitians
and to deter further immigration. Since in the past the Haitian govern-
ment had not made any concerted effort regarding this matter,29 it ap-
Recent Haitian Immigration to the United States 2 (Cong. Research Service, Library of Cong.,
Feb. 9, 1981) (125,000 Cubans processed) [hereinafter cited as Recent Haitian Immigration].
24. Masanz, Recent Haitian Immigration, supra note 23, at 16. Later Haitian migrants,
however, were not eligible for this federal assistance. Taylor, supra note 1, at E4, col. 1.
25. See, e.g., Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 662-64 (testimony of Dewey
Knight, Jr., Ass't County Manager, Dade County, Fla.) (absorption problems generally); id. at
665-68 (testimony of Linda Berkowitz, Operations and Management Consultant for Refugee
Affairs, Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Fla., District 11) (impact on social serv-
ices); id. at 676-78 (testimony, prepared statement, and statistical cost tables of Paul W. Bell,
Associate Superintendent, Bureau of Education, Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Fla.)
(impact on educational services); Coast Guard Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1982) (written statement of Charles Kimbrell, Miami Citizens Against
Crime Organization) (destitute Haitians as burden on system) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Coast
Guard Hearings].
26. 1982 Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 25, at 131 (statement of Rep. Pepper, of Flor-
ida) (drug traffickers, not Haitians, responsible for upswing in homicides); id. at 206 (statement
of Rep. Hughes) (Haitians good citizens who had not contributed to domestic crime rate;
should not link interdiction of Haitians with preventing crime); id. at 252 (written statement of
Charles Kimbrell) (no evidence that Haitians contribute significantly to crime problem).
27. Id. at 252 (written statement of Charles Kimbrell) (language barrier is burden on sys-
tem); N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1981, at 71, col. 1 (cultural and language problems make treatment
of Haitians difficult; shortage of translators exists).
28. See Refugees or Prisoners? Newsweek, Feb. 2, 1982, 16, 24 & 29.
29. This was probably, in part, because many Haitian officials allegedly prospered from
kickbacks provided by smugglers. See, e.g., A. STEPICK, HAITIAN REnUFEES IN THE U.S. 11
(Minority Rights Group, Report No. 52, 1982) [hereinafter cited as STEPICK, M.R.G. RE-
PORT]; Interview with Michael S. Hooper, Director of Research and Director of Haiti Project,
The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, in New York City (May 19, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Hooper Interview]; Interview with William Woodward, Staff Director of
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
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peared that absent U.S. action the Haitian influx would continue.30
Until the summer of 1981 the INS had usually released Haitians to
sponsors in the community, under the government's discretionary parole
authority, pending final decisions in their exclusion, deportation, or asy-
lum proceedings. 31 Although few Haitian migrants had been granted
political asylum in the United States,32 those who reached this country
often could prolong their stays for many years through lawsuits challeng-
ing INS adjudicatory procedures and through use of the appeals pro-
cess.33 By 1981, this had created a backlog of six to seven thousand
Haitian deportation cases in the Miami office of the INS.
34
The U.S. government responded with efforts to facilitate the removal
of the Haitians, each of which was challenged in federal court. To expe-
dite the return of Haitians from the United States and to deter further
migration, the INS instituted a program of expedited hearings in the
summer of 1981, and conducted mass exclusion hearings behind closed
doors. 35 However, federal courts held that this procedure violated both
Fisheries, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Woodward Interview].
Mr. Hooper is presently Executive Director of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees.
Other reasons suggested for the past inaction of the Haitian government were that (1) emigra-
tion afforded an escape valve for the country's high unemployment, and (2) the emigrants sent
back significant revenue, helping the ailing Haitian economy. See Sending Them Back to Ha-
iti, Time, June 22, 1981, at 21.
30. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 22, at 2.
31. US. Announces New Policy for Parole of Some Haitians, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at
A24, col. 1. (new parole policy "essentially a return to the policy of a year ago," perhaps as a
face-saving decision by the Administration). Those apprehended before entering the United
States are subject to exclusion proceedings, while those who have effected "entry," even if
illegally, face deportation hearings and are afforded more extensive procedural safeguards. See
infra note 64 and accompanying text. Regarding asylum proceedings, see infra notes 60-84 and
accompanying text.
32. See Masanz, Immigration: Undocumented Haitians, supra note 23, at 3 (while over
15,000 Haitians were processed between October 1980 and October 1981, and most requested
asylum, only five were granted asylum in fiscal year 1981). It is difficult to get valid statistics
on the number of Haitians granted and denied asylum since 1972. According to a report
prepared by the National Council of Churches in April 1980, the INS in November 1979
stated that it rejected more than 99 percent of Haitian asylum requests. The next month the
Acting INS Commissioner stated in a letter to a congressman that "only 58 Haitians had been
granted asylum in the United States." NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE
U.S.A., HAITIAN REFUGEES NEED ASYLUM: A BRIEFING PAPER 14 (April 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES]. See also Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,
503 F. Supp. at 510 (all of the Haitian asylum applications processed during the "Haitian
Program" challenged by that suit had been denied).
33. See, eg., Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442; Pierre v. United States,
547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 863, vacated and remanded, 434 U.S.
962 (1977), on remand 570 F.2d 95 (1978); Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.
Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded without opinion, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978), on remand,
460 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978), remanded with directions to vacate and dismiss, 631 F.2d
1247 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1981, at 7, col. 1 (mass deportation hearings in locked court-
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constitutional and statutory protections. Attorneys representing Hai-
tians moved successfully to enjoin these mass hearings3 6 and secured an
emergency stay of deportation for persons tried under the expedited pro-
cedures.37 The INS agreed to hold new individual hearings for these per-
sons, 38 but those hearings also failed to provide the required procedural
safeguards.
39
The INS also instituted a policy of detaining all newly-arrived Haitians
rather than releasing them to sponsors, believing that this detention pol-
icy would ensure their appearance at hearings, facilitate more rapid
processing of individual cases, and deter further migration. 4° Lawyers
successfully challenged this detention policy on both due process and
equal protection grounds, only to have the decision overturned by the
Eleventh Circuit in February 1984.41
In the context of these controversies over expedited procedures and
room produce complaints and inquiries). Note that the 1978 "Haitian program", in which
asylum hearings had been speeded up and summary denials of asylum had been issued, was
successfully challenged in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. at 452, as violative
of the Constitution, immigration statutes, international agreements, and INS regulations and
operating procedures. In Haitian Refugee Center, the court ordered the detained Haitians re-
leased on parole.
36. See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, at 16, col. 1 (basic contentions of the attorneys in case
before Judge Hastings). See also N.Y. Times, June 28, 1981, at A28, col. 3 (allegations of
problems with translators); N.Y. Times, July 7, 1981, at 10, col. 1 (translation errors, e.g., after
judge asked Haitian whether he wished to appeal the deportation order to a higher court,
translator asked Haitian if he wished to move to a larger courtroom); Wash. Post, Oct. 19,
1981, at Al, col. I (translator asked Haitians if they wanted to go to an insane asylum rather
than asking if they were seeking political asylum).
37. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, at 16, col. 1 (emergency stay). On September 9, 1981, the
attorneys won a temporary restraining order, converted three weeks later into a preliminary
injunction, barring deportation of Haitians detained pending exclusion proceedings and not
represented by a lawyer. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F.Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (Hastings, J.).
See Wash. Post, supra note 36, at All, col. 4.
38. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1981, at 10, col. 1 (Justice Department said it was willing to hold
new hearings).
39. Wash. Post, supra note 36, at A10, col. 2. For example, because hearings were sched-
uled simultaneously in three courtrooms, lawyers had to run from room to room seeking con-
tinuances. Id.
40. See N.Y. Times, supra note 31, at col. 3; Task Force Memorandum, supra note 22, at
10. See also Wash. Post, June 12, 1981, at Al (describing Reagan Administration Task Force
recommendations).
41. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 997 (S.D. Fla. 1982), modified sub nom. Jean v.
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rehg
denied, 733 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 563 (1984), Louis v. Nelson,
544 F.Supp. 1004, 1006-09 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (final judgment of Judge Spelman ordering tempo-
rary parole release, issued eleven days after above decision). The district court focused its
analysis on violations of due process; the three-judge circuit court panel also found that equal
protection violations had occurred. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed in a Febru-
ary 1984 decision, holding that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights with respect to
applications for admission, asylum, or parole. The court noted that the interdiction policy was
not at issue in that litigation. 727 F.2d at 963 n.3. See also Taylor, supra note 1, at E4, col. 1
(new parole policy announced in anticipation of decision in Louis v. Nelson).
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detention, the Reagan Administration announced its policy of interdic-
tion on the high seas.42 The interdiction program prevented Haitians
from reaching the United States and claiming the procedural protections
afforded by the Constitution and federal statutes. It also effectively ex-
ploited the ambiguities of both international and domestic protections of
refugees, while clearly violating their spirit.
II. The Refugee Status of Haitian Migrants
A. International Law
The United Nations Convention43 and Protocol44 Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees define a refugee as any person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. .... 45
The principle of non-refoulement protects refugees from return to a
country where they would face persecution.46 Article 33(1) of the Con-
vention sets forth this principle: "[No Contracting State shall return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion." 47 The United States, as a party to the Protocol, is bound
42. Indeed, the interdiction program should be seen as part of a more broadly-conceived
immigration program to regain control over U.S. borders. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.Supp. at
980 n. 19 ("interdiction and detention", one of the options developed by the Justice Depart-
ment, was endorsed by most other departments).
43. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [here-
inafter cited as Convention]. The United States is not a party to the Convention but is a party
to the Protocol, which incorporates Articles 2-34 of the Convention.
44. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (The United States acceded on
Nov. 1, 1968 with reservations). [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
45. Id. art. I, § 2.
46. See A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 43 (1980) for an argument that the
rule of non-refoulement is a generally accepted principle. Other authorities, however, see as
uncertain whether non-refoulement has yet been accepted as an obligation binding on states
that have not acceded to the Protocol. See Recent Developments, Refugees - United Nations
Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, July 20-21, 1979, 21 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 290, 296-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]; Recent Develop-
ments, Alien's Rights - The Refugee Act of 1980 as a Response to the Protocol; The First Test,
14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561, 581 (1981).
47. 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 33(1). The definition of a refugee and the principle of non-
refoulement are considered so fundamental that no state may make reservations to these provi-
sions. See Protocol, supra note 44, at art. VII. See also Introductory Note by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF/29/Rev. 3 (1978).
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by the principle of non-refoulement.48
Asylum seekers are further protected by the principle of first asylum.
This principle provides that, in cases of a large-scale influx of refugees,
the state in which the refugees first seek asylum should admit them with-
out discrimination and provide at least temporary shelter and protection,
even if that state cannot admit them permanently. 49
These principles do not, however, provide a clear and binding interna-
tional prescription. Complexity arises from the asymmetry between the
individual's right to leave his country and to seek and enjoy asylum, and
the lack of corresponding state obligations to afford entry and grant
asylum.
This imbalance is inherent in the concept of state sovereignty. States
have traditionally claimed absolute discretion in determining admission
and granting asylum.50 States have no internationally-imposed duty to
admit any aliens: admission of individuals remains a moral matter left to
national discretion.5 1 The right of asylum in international law is the right
of a state, in its discretion, to grant asylum. While the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights accords every person the right "to leave any coun-
try, including his own" 52 and "to seek and enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution," 53 the individual's right to be granted asylum
48. See Protocol, supra note 44.
49. Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees (adopted by the Exec. Comm.
of the UNHCR Programme) 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 124) at 16, U.N. Doe. A/AC.96/601
(1981).
50. See G. GoODwIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
BETWEEN STATES 50-57, 137-38 (1978); A GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 46, at 2. See also W.
Smith, The Refugee Crisis: Solving the Problems, 67 A.B.A. J. 1464 (1981) (discussing the
dilemma and the need for international standards for determining refugee status to ensure non-
refoulement).
51. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 46, at 43 (right to gain admission belongs to moral
sphere); G. GOODWIN-GILL supra note 50, at 20, 50-57 (national, discretionary decision; no
individual right of entry).
52. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR at 71
(art. 13(2)), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration].
53. Id. art. 14(1). Arguably, the rights expressed in the Universal Declaration have be-
come norms of customary international law. See Final Act of the International Conference on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 4 (U.N. Publ. E.68.XIV.2) (1968) (Universal
Declaration is obligatory for members of the international community); Montreal Statement of
the Assembly for Human Rights 2 (1968), reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS 94,
95 (1968) (Universal Declaration is part of customary international law). See also 2 L. SOHN &
T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION,oF HUMAN RIGHTS, 549-59 (1972) (dis-
cussion of authority and impact of the Universal Declaration on decisions taken by the UN, on
international treaties and conventions, and on national constitutions, municipal laws, and
court decisions); K. Kalumiya, U.S. Interdiction of Haitian Boats on the High Seas 8 (Oct. 12,
1981) (unpublished interoffice memorandum of the Washington Liaison Office of UNHCR)
[hereinafter cited as Kalumiya Memorandum]. But see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 50 at
44. Judge Richey, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (D.D.C.
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has not evolved into a general principle of international law.54 Finally,
the Universal Declaration provides an "escape clause" allowing states to
impose limits on guaranteed rights for a number of reasons including
protection of the "general welfare." 55
Some limits on national discretion do exist, however, and have found
recognition in international law. The principle of non-refoulement re-
stricts this discretion by prohibiting a state from returning a bona fide
refugee to a state where he or she has a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.56 The norm of non-discrimination on racial grounds also limits
state discretion in immigration and asylum decisions.57
Even within these international norms for the protection of refugees,
states do retain broad procedural discretion. While the Protocol defines a
refugee, it does not specify the procedures that states must follow in de-
termining refugee status, leaving their development to each contracting
state.58 However, if a state does not employ procedures that effectively
determine which aliens qualify as refugees, international principles, such
as non-refoulement, will be rendered meaningless in practice. 59
B. United States Law
To fulfill the United States' legal obligations under the Protocol, Con-
gress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1980 to
incorporate the Protocol's definition of a refugee.6° In the Refugee Act
1985), entirely ignored the idea that the Universal Declaration has become part of customary
international law.
54. A. GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 46, at 2,42 (only rudimentary provisions of individual
right to asylum in international law; no international obligation to grant asylum); G. GOOD-
WIN-GILL, supra note 50, at 137-38 (right of state and not of refugee); Pugash, Dilemma of the
Sea Refugee: Rescue Without Refuge, 18 HARv. INT'L L. J. 577, 586 (1977) (no right to be
granted asylum due to territorial sovereignty of states). See also Comment, Can the Boat Peo-
ple Assert a Right to Remain in Asylum?, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 176 (1980) (concerning
Indochinese refugees).
55. Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 29(2). This is a very broad exception. See
Norfeiger, The Right of Migration Under the Helsinki Accords, 1980 S. ILL. U. L. J. 395, 401
(1980).
56. G. GoODwIN-GILL, supra note 50, at 196.
57. Id. Article 3 of the Convention, supra note 43, provides that contracting states must
apply the provisions of the Convention without discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or
national origin.
58. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 50, at 196. See also Declaration on Territorial Asy-
lum, infra note 116, art. 1, § 3, which provides that "[i]t shall rest with the State granting
asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum." See notes 60-84 and accompanying
text infra, for a discussion of procedures provided by the United States for determining refugee
status in the asylum context.
59. See U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 10, U.N. Doc. No. A/34/12 (1979) (recognition of
the practical importance of appropriate procedures); Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53,
at 2 (concern with fairness and impartiality of interdiction procedures).
60. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 108 (1980) [hereinafter cited
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of 1980, Congress expressed concern for the treatment of refugees and a
desire to determine refugee status on the merits of individual cases, not
on geographical or ideological grounds as had been done previously.61 In
recognition of the United States' obligation under the Protocol to abide
by the principle of non-refoulement, Congress adopted a statutory asy-
lum procedure62 and mandated that the Attorney General could not de-
port an alien to a country if he determined that "such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
'63
The asylum provision manifests a congressional intent to treat all asy-
lum applicants alike. Whereas other provisions of the INA treat aliens
differently depending on whether they are lawfully or unlawfully in the
United States and whether they are excludable or deportable,64 section
208 explicitly eliminates these distinctions for purposes of asylum deter-
uinations, directing the Attorney General to establish "a procedure" for
an alien to apply for asylum, "irrespective of such alien's status."' 65 The
as Refugee Act], adding Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as INA]. See INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489
(1984) (while the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit decision, 678 F.2d 401 (1982), as
to the standard of proof to avoid deportation under section 243(h), it did note that the above
provision brought the domestic law definition of refugee into compliance with the Protocol).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 13 (1979) (Committee noted that the
new definition of a refugee eliminates geographical and ideological restrictions and brings U.S.
statutory law into conformity with the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees: ". . . the plight of the refugees themselves, as opposed to national origins or polit-
ical considerations, should be paramount in determining which refugees are to be admitted to
the United States.").
62. Refugee Act, supra note 60, § 201(b), adding INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp.
V 1981).
63. Id. § 203(e), amending INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Previ-
ously, the Attorney General retained discretion concerning the withholding of deportation.
See also H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 61, at 17-18 (1979) (statement of congressional pur-
pose regarding asylum and the withholding of deportation provisions). The differences be-
tween granting asylum and withholding deportation were considered by the Supreme Court in
Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, a case in which relief was sought under section 243(h). Specifically, the
court held that the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard contained in the Protocol
definition of refugee (and in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA) did not apply to withholding of
deportation under section 243(h). It noted that section 243(h), unlike other Refugee Act pro-
visions governing discretionary relief, "does not refer to Section 101(a)(42)(A)."
64. Compare, eg., INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1981) with INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(b)(1981) (judicial review of administrative determinations differs in exclusion and de-
portation cases. Congress may distinguish between aliens who have effected "entry" into this
country, even if illegally, and those who have not, and are therefore excludable). See Candon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957); Jean,
727 F.2d at 968.
65. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Attorney General implemented
the congressional directive by establishing a single set of regulations entitled "Asylum requests
in exclusion or deportation proceedings." 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1982).
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aslyum procedure is to apply to aliens "at a land border or port of entry"
as well as to aliens physically present in the United States.
66
United States law and accompanying administrative regulations pro-
vide several procedural protections to asylum seekers. Under section 208
of the Refugee Act, Congress created a statutory right to apply for asy-
lum. 67 Arguably asylum seekers must be informed of their right to apply
for asylum.68 INS regulations set forth procedures under which a person
seeking asylum and not yet subject to exclusion or deportation proceed-
ings may apply in writing to the district director of the INS.69 An immi-
gration officer shall interview the applicant7 ° and must request an
advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs of the Department of State before the district director makes a
decision on the asylum application.
71
If the district director approves the application, the alien is granted
asylum status for one year;72 otherwise, an alien seeking admission to the
United States will be placed under exclusion proceedings 73 and an alien
in the United States will be granted voluntary departure status or placed
under deportation proceedings.74 No appeal from the decision of the dis-
trict director is allowed,75 but the alien may renew the application for
asylum before the immigration judge in exclusion or deportation
66. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981).
67. Id. See also Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982)
(congressional intent to grant aliens the right to apply for asylum and to have an opportunity
to substantiate their claims for asylum).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1982) provides in pertinent part that the alien in a deportation
proceeding "shall be advised that pursuant to section 243(h) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act he may apply for temporary withholding of deportation to the country or countries
specified by the special inquiry officer......" The district court in Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F.
Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Tex. 1982), dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982), issued a temporary
injunction requiring prison officials to inform Salvadoran and Guatemalan prison detainees of
their right to apply for asylum. Excludable aliens, however, apparently merit different treat-
ment. See Jean, 727 F.2d at 979, 981-83 (such persons "do not have the right to be notified of
the opportunity to seek asylum.").
69. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) (1982).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (1982). The interview must be made under oath, INS Operating
Instructions § 208.9(a), and is to occur within 45 days of the filing of the application. Id.
71. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1982). The applicant must be given an opportunity to inspect and
explain or rebut this opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1982). See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.8
(1982). The decision must be in writing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(b) (1982). The district director shall
adjudicate the application without an advisory opinion if he or she has not received the advi-
sory opinion within 45 days after the State Department (Bureau of Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs) received the request for an opinion. INS Operating Instructions
§ 208.9(c).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e)(1982).
73. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (1982).
74. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(4) (1982).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(c) (1982).
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proceedings. 76
An applicant for asylum is afforded the additional procedural protec-
tions available to any alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings. The
alien has a right to be represented by counsel 77 and is to be informed of
this right.78 Other protections include the right to present evidence and
to rebut the INS trial attorney's evidence. 79 If the judge approves the
asylum application, the alien is granted asylum for one year;8 0 if the
judge denies it, the exclusion or deportation proceedings are reinsti-
tuted.8' The INA and accompanying regulations do not provide a sepa-
rate process for appeal from denial of an asylum application, but the
alien may appeal the denial in the course of appealing to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) from a final order of exclusion or deporta-
tion entered after the denial of asylum.82 The INA provides for judicial
review if the BIA affirms the immigration judge's denial of asylum and
order of exclusion or deportation.
8 3
The current immigration statute and regulations thus afford an asylum
applicant significant procedural protections, even if the applicant has not
effected legal "entry" and is therefore subject to exclusion hearings.
These afford an opportunity for determinations based on the merits of
76. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1982). An alien who did not apply to the district director for asylum
may still apply to the immigration judge in the exclusion or deportation hearing. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.10(a) (1982). The immigration judge may adjourn the hearing for up to thirty days to
permit the application to be filed. 8 C.F.R § 236.3(a) (1982). If there is no State Department
advisory opinion on the application, the judge must adjourn the hearing for up to thirty days
pending a response. 8 C.F.R §§ 208.10(b), 236.3(a)(1) (1982). Once the advisory opinion has
been received, the applicant may inspect and explain or rebut it. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b) (1982).
Many of these procedures would be altered significantly under the Simpson-Mazzoli legisla-
tion introduced in the last three sessions of Congress. See proposed section 124 of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1983 H.R. 1510/S. 529, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983), which
would effect major reforms in the asylum adjudication process.
77. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976); 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
(1976).
78. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1982) (exclusion hearings); 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1982) (deporta-
tion hearings).
79. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(a)(2) (1982) (exclusion); 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1982) (deportation).
80. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(e) (1982). The INS may appeal the grant of asylum to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) 8 C.F.R. § 236.7 (1982), and the alien will be given notice that the
decision is subject to such appeal, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (1982). He will be notified of any appeal
and have the opportunity to submit written information to the BIA in support of the decision
to grant asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 236.7(c) (1982).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(f) (1982).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 236.7 (1982) (exclusion); 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1982) (deportation).
83. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1981). An excludable alien is limited to judicial
review in habeas corpus proceedings. INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1981). A deportable
alien may obtain judicial review in the judicial circuit in which the deportation proceedings
took place by bringing an action against the INS within six months of the date of the final
order of deportation. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1981). New section 123 ("judicial
review") of the proposed Simpson-Mazzoli legislation would effect certain changes in this area.
See supra note 76.
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individual cases. Though they may also enable applicants to prolong the
process indefinitely,8 4 they are consistent with concepts of due process
and equal protection.
III. Description of the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program
On September 29, 1981, President Reagan formally announced a pro-
gram of interdiction of undocumented migrants on the high seas. The
general provisions of this program are set forth in a presidential procla-
mation 85 and in an executive order.
86
The proclamation suspends entry of undocumented aliens from the
high seas as detrimental to the interests of the United States and an-
nounces that the United States will prevent their entry by the interdiction
of certain vessels carrying such aliens.87 The Executive Order directs the
Secretary of State to enter into "cooperative arrangements with appropri-
ate foreign governments" to prevent illegal migration to the United
States by sea.88 The United States to date has reached such an agreement
only with the Haitian government, by way of an exchange of diplomatic
notes.89 The Haitian government assured the United States that inter-
dicted Haitians will not be harmed when they are returned to Haiti.90
The executive order further compels the Coast Guard to enforce the
suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens and the interdiction of
vessels outside United States territorial waters. The Coast Guard may
interdict vessels of the United States, those without nationality, and those
of foreign nations that have consented to interdiction in agreements with
the United States. 91
The Coast Guard is to stop and board vessels suspected of carrying
illegal aliens or of violating United States law or the law of a country that
has consented to interdiction.92 Pursuant to this authority, and accord-
ing to guidelines defined by the INS, the commanding officer of the Coast
Guard ship has the discretion to decide which vessels to stop and when
84. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
85. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app.
at 820 (Supp. V. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Proclamation].
86. Exec. Order 12324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at
819-20 (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order].
87. Proclamation, supra note 85.
88. Exec. Order, supra note 86, at 48,109.
89. Exchange of Letters between Ernest Preeg, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, and Edouard
Francisque, Haitian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sept. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Exchange of Letters].
90. Id.
91. Exec. Order, supra note 86, at 48,109.
92. Id.
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and in what manner to board them. 93 Coast Guard personnel are to
make any initial announcements to those on board the interdicted vessel
regarding the purpose of boarding, separation of crew and passengers,
and general procedures, including advice that the boarded vessel may be
returned to the country which consented to interdiction. 94 The Coast
Guard also determines whether it is "safe and practicable" for INS per-
sonnel to speak to persons on board.
95
The INS Guidelines emphasize the responsibility of the INS officers
involved in the interdiction to ensure United States compliance with its
obligations not to return refugees to a country where they have a well-
founded fear of persecution.96 Under the Guidelines, INS employees are
to watch for indications that a person may qualify as a refugee under the
UN Convention and Protocol.97 The duties of the INS employees are
specifically limited to matters related to interviews concerning documen-
tation for entry to the United States and possible evidence of refugee
status.98 Unarmed INS employees and Creole interpreters are to be
members of each boarding party.99 When the commanding officer of the
Coast Guard vessel deems it safe and practicable, the INS employees are
to speak to each person on board, through an interpreter if necessary,
and to record each person's name, date of birth, nationality, home town,
documents, and reasons for departure. 1°°
If there are indications that a person may qualify as a refugee, the INS
93. INS Role in and Guidelines for Interdiction at Sea (Oct. 6, 1981) (unpublished memo-
randum from Doris Meissner, Acting Commissioner of INS, to all INS employees assigned to
duties related to interdiction at sea) [hereinafter cited as INS Guidelines].
94. Id. at 2. The Coast Guard vessel also performs its other normal functions of search
and rescue and interdiction of drug traffic. See 47-81 COMMANDANT'S BULLETIN 13 (Nov.
16, 1981).
95. Id. If the Coast Guard officers find it is "safe and practicable," they will advise the INS
personnel as to the best location for interviewing those on board. Telephone interview with
Willard Woodward, Staff Director, Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Dec. 7, 1981).
96. INS Guidelines, supra note 93, at 1.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Associate Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani appears to have testified before the
House Coast Guard Subcommittee, on February 8, 1982, that the initial questioning of each
person on board also includes inquiries concerning the reasons for the individual's desire to go
to the United States and whether or not the individual fears to return to Haiti. 1982 Coast
Guard Hearings, supra note 25, at 190 (testimony of Giuliani). When informed by Subcommit-
tee Chairman Rep. Gerry E. Studds that these additional questions were not posed to persons
aboard a vessel interdicted on January 10, 1982, Mr. Giuliani replied that
[w]hen these matters were first discussed, it was my view that INS should uniformly and
directly ask each person if they fear returning to Haiti. My testimony before your Com-
mittee reflected both my opinion and my belief that such a question should uniformly be
included. I have, therefore, asked INS to amend the written guidelines to reflect the fact
that a question concerning whether there is some reason why the individual should not be
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officers are to conduct individual interviews, out of the hearing of other
persons, regarding possible refugee status, and are to make individual
records of all such second interviews. 10 1 If necessary, INS officers may
consult with Department of State officials concerning possible refugee
status.102 If the individual interview suggests that the interviewee may
have a legitimate claim to refugee status, that individual is to be removed
from the interdicted vessel and transported to the United States,10 3 where
he or she may file a formal application for asylum.1°4
If the INS officials determine that the persons on board the interdicted
vessel are violating or attempting to violate either United States immigra-
tion laws or appropriate Haitian laws and that they do not qualify for
refugee status, the Coast Guard is to return the vessel and its occupants
to Haiti or transfer responsibility for their return to Haitian naval au-
thorities. 10 5 The agreement with Haiti provides that a Haitian naval of-
ficer is to serve as a liaison on board the Coast Guard vessel that is
responsible for interdiction.' 0 6 Finally, in an effort to ensure that persons
returned to Haiti are not persecuted there, representatives of the Depart-
ment of State are to monitor the returnees periodically. 10 7
Since the first reported interdiction on October 25, 1981,108 the Coast
Guard has interdicted more than 70 vessels carrying undocumented mi-
grants.'0 9 In 1982, 152 Haitians were interdicted and returned to Haiti;
in 1983, 651; and in 1984, more than 4000,110 including 2050 during the
returned to Haiti should be asked during the initial questioning of all on board interdicted
vessels headed for the United States.
Letter from R. Giuliani to the Honorable Gerry E. Studds, at 2 (Mar. 23, 1982).
101. INS Guidelines, supra note 93, at 2.
102. Id. This consultation may be with State Department officials on board the Coast
Guard vessel if any are present, or via radio communications.
103. Id. The record of his on-board interview also will be sent to the United States.
104. Letter from Doris Meissner, Acting INS Commissioner, to Gary Perkins, Chief of
Washington, D.C. Mission of UNHCR, at 2 (Dec. 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Meissner
letter].
105. Exec. Order, supra note 86, at 48,109; 1981 Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 22, at
6, 10 (testimony of David Hiller).
106. Exchange of Letters, supra note 89, at 3. Apparently, however, no document specifies
this officer's location or duties during an interdiction operation.
107. Meissner letter, supra note 104, at 2. But see infra notes 145-54 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in monitoring treatment of returnees to Haiti.
108. See COMMANDANT'S BULLETIN, supra note 94, at 14; N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at
1, col. 2.
109. Thomas, Search and Interdict, SEA POWER 35, 42 (Aug. 1984). In addition to contin-
uing to patrol the Windward Passage off the coast of Haiti, since June 1983 the Coast Guard
has interdicted vessels beyond United States territorial waters near Florida in an effort to stem
the increased flow of Haitians coming to the United States by way of the Bahamas. Some of
these vessels carried non-Haitian migrants as well. Id.
110. Miami Herald, Dec. 31, 1984, at 3A, col. 1. Statement by Alan C. Nelson, Commis-
sioner of INS, in response to question by Rep. McCollum of Florida at Mar. 20, 1985 INS
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of
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last four months of the year.11 1
The interdiction program appears initially to have had the desired de-
terrent effect: the number of undocumented Haitians apprehended enter-
ing the United States dropped from approximately 1000 per month in the
summer of 1981112 to 134 in all of 1982.113 This number, however, has
increased as the number of interdictions has increased, to 333 in 1983
and over 800 in 1984.114 Thus, many Haitians have not been deterred
from attempting entry into the United States by the existence of the in-
terdiction program.
IV. Analysis of the Interdiction Program Under International Law
The Haitian migrant interdiction program poses a number of problems
under international law and United States treaty obligations.
A. The Principle of Non-Refoulement
As discussed above, the principle of non-refoulement protects refugees
from compulsory return to a country in which they will face persecu-
tion. 115 The question here is whether this protection extends to refugees
interdicted on the high seas. Article 3 of the Declaration on Territorial
Asylum prohibits rejection of a refugee at the frontier of a state as well as
the return of a refugee already within the territory of a state in which
asylum is sought.116 The Declaration is not legally binding, however,
and provides an exception for overriding reasons of national security or
to safeguard the population.
11 7
A difference of opinion exists as to whether non-refoulement pertains
to those on the high seas, who are, by definition, outside the territory of a
state. The recent district court opinion in Haitian Refugee Center v.
the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Statement by Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner of INS] (4000 Haitians were interdicted
and returned at a cost of 63 million dollars in 1984).
111. USA Today, Feb. 6, 1985, at 2A, col. 3.
112. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
113. Miami Herald, supra note 110 at 3A, col.1. See also Staff of House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Report of Staff Study Mission on U.S. Refugee Policy-
Caribbean 2 (Mar. 15, 1982) (unpublished) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter cited as Foreign Affairs Staff Report].
114. Miami Herald, supra note 110, at 3A, col. 1. Despite this increase in the number of
undocumented Haitians entering the United States, INS has recently reasserted that the pro-
gram is effective in deterring migration and saving lives. Statement by Alan C. Nelson, Com-
missioner of INS, supra note 110.
115. See supra notes 46-47 & 56 and accompanying text.
116. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 23/2, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16),
U.N. Doe. A/52/7 (1967), art. 3(1).
117. Id. at art. 3(2). The exception to "safeguard the population" may include cases of a
mass influx of persons.
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Gracey' 18 stated that this provision of the Protocol, as implemented in
the United States through the Refugee Act of 1980, did not provide any
relief to aliens outside the territory of the United States. By contrast, the
legal officer for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) in the United States has argued that non-refoulement does
protect refugees on the high seas.119 The Reagan Administration would
appear to have indicated its implicit agreement that non-refoulement ap-
plies on the high seas, for it has stated repeatedly that if a Haitian is
found to be a bona fide refugee, the interdicting authorities will not re-
turn him against his will.
120
The Reagan Administration's position has been that while individuals
claiming they would be persecuted if returned to Haiti must be given an
opportunity to substantiate their claims, the interdiction procedures do
comport with the Convention and Protocol. 121 In reality, however, the
interdiction procedures may fail to identify refugees and thus not ensure
that the United States will fulfill its obligation under the Protocol not to
return refugees to a country where they would face persecution.
122
Recognizing the vulnerable position of most potential refugees, the
UNHCR has established non-binding guidelines and basic requirements
with which any procedures to determine refugee status should comply. 123
These stress the importance of individual interviews, in which statements
are to be treated as confidential in order to encourage truthfulness. 124
The examiner should give the applicant guidance concerning the proce-
dures to be followed in applying for refugee status.1 25 Opportunities
should exist for contact between UNHCR officials and asylum appli-
118. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985).
119. See Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, for an argument that non-refoulement
applies to refugees outside the territory of a state that seeks to return the refugee, and that it
therefore binds the United States with respect to the interdiction program.
120. See, eg., Exec. Order No. 12324, supra note 86, at § 2(c)(3) ("No person who is a
refugee will be returned without his consent.").
121. See T. Olson, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
the Attorney General Re: Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels 8 (Aug. 11, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Olson, Interdiction Memorandum].
122. See Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, at 4 (U.S. policy not within spirit of non-
refoulement principle or of the universal right to seek and enjoy asylum); Letter from Ameri-
can Immigration Lawyers' Association (AILA) to President Reagan (Oct. 5, 1981) (conditions
for the interviews are in derogation of fundamental human rights recognized by the Protocol);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A34, col. 1 (editorial denouncing interdiction procedures as "nau-
tical kangaroo courts; walrus courts, one might call them").
123. HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
45-49, Office of the UNHCR (1959) [hereinafter cited as UNHCR HANDBOOK] (general
guidelines); 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 15, U.N. Doc. No. A/32/12/Add.l (1977)
(UNHCR Exec. Committee recommendations of basic requirements).
124. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 10-11, 48.
125. 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 15, U.N. Doc. No. A/32/12/Add.1 (1977).
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cants. 126 Finally, if the examiner denies an asylum claim, an opportunity
to appeal to a judicial or administrative authority should be available.
127
United States interdiction procedures do not follow these UNHCR
guidelines. Migrants may in some circumstances be returned to Haiti
without any interview with INS officials because the procedures require
interviews only if and when the Coast Guard commanding officer deems
it "safe and practicable" to hold them. 128 Even if interviews are held, a
migrant first must give some indication of fear of persecution at the ini-
tial "interview," which is not confidential, in order to be entitled to a
second interview held outside the hearing of others. 129 The questions
asked during the initial interview are perfunctory and not designed to
reveal the migrant's reasons for leaving Haiti; there is none of the fact-
finding or indirect probing concerning the migrant's motivations, beliefs,
and background that immigration lawyers consider essential to the devel-
opment of an asylum claim.
1 30
INS examiners are not required to give even those migrants who ex-
press a fear of persecution any guidance in applying for asylum. 131 Un-
less an examiner determines that an applicant qualifies to be taken to the
United States, no provision is made for contact between UNHCR offi-
cials and the applicant. 132 If an examiner determines that an applicant's
claim is unfounded, no appeal is available. 133
The basic problem recognized by the UNHCR, of the vulnerability of
many potential refugees who are questioned by foreign authorities in an
unfamiliar environment, is accentuated in the Haitian interdiction con-
126. Id.
127. Id. The UNHCR recognizes another problem as well: many potential refugees are
vulnerable and face serious problems in submitting their asylum claims to authorities because
of language barriers, general fear of government officials, and so forth. See UNHCR HAND-
BOOK, supra note 123, at 15.
128. See INS Guidelines, supra note 93, at 2 (questioning will take place to the extent
deemed "safe and practicable").
129. Id. The need for an affirmative act by the migrant at the initial interview is analogous
to section 121 of the proposed Simpson-Mazzoli legislation, supra note 76, which would sum-
marily exclude aliens who failed to state affirmatively that they were seeking asylum.
130. See, e.g., Hooper Interview, supra note 29; L. Mabry, Human Rights Violations by
the United States of America in the Treatment of Haitian Refugees 3 (Mar. 4, 1982) (statement
on behalf of the National Council of Churches before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights) [hereinafter cited as Mabry Statement].
131. See INS Guidelines, supra note 93. Under the UNHCR Guidelines, those who do not
express a fear of persecution and a desire not to return arguably need not be informed of their
right to apply for asylum. Yet U.S. procedures do not even require that such persons be
informed of the right to apply for asylum when they have made such a representation; the INS
officer is given complete discretion in conducting the second interview of such potential refu-
gees. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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text. Haitians tend to fear authority because of their experiences with the
Tonton Macoutes and other government officials at home.134 Moreover,
a Haitian naval officer remains on board the interdicting Coast Guard
vessel.135 The location of the interview also exacerbates the vulnerability:
the boat may be crowded, it may be nighttime, and the migrants may be
in poor physical or psychological condition. Such circumstances are not
conducive to fair and effective preliminary determinations concerning
refugee status. 136 These non-confidential interviews, lasting only a few
minutes and conducted through interpreters, do not satisfy the UNHCR
guidelines calling for thorough interviews to protect against the return of
bona fide refugees.
137
The principle of non-refoulement is also threatened by the unreliability
of the Haitian government's assurances that it will not mistreat return-
ees. Coupled with the United States government's inability to monitor
treatment of returnees and to enforce these assurances, this makes it
probable that some returnees to Haiti will face persecution. The Haitian
government will know the returnees' identities because the United States
government is obliged to inform the Haitian authorities of the detention
of any Haitian flag vessels and any subsequent actions taken.1 38 Those
who left Haiti because of persecution or fear of persecution but who, due
134. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text. William Woodward, who was present
during the January 10, 1982 interdiction, stated that the Haitians, because they were being
held by uniformed persons, assumed that they would be turned over to Haitian legal authori-
ties for leaving Haiti without visas. Woodward Interview, supra note 29. Attorneys who have
represented Haitian asylum applicants in the United States note that this fear of authority (and
the lack of understanding of the U.S. system) makes applicants reluctant to tell even their
attorneys the true reasons for their flight from Haiti. Statements of Ira Kurzban, lead counsel
for the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami, and Dale F. Swartz, Executive Director of the Na-
tional Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum in Washington, D.C., Workshop on Liti-
gating Haitian cases, held at the Yale Law School (Nov. 6, 1982) (notes on file with the Yale
Journal of International Law).
135. See Exchange of Letters, supra note 89, at 3 (Haitian naval officer's presence author-
ized and no restrictions imposed); Woodward Interview, supra note 29 (Haitian officer present
on board January 10, 1982; Coast Guard commander used discretion to keep him away from
the migrants).
136. See Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, at 2 (concern with high seas locus of
interviews).
137. See Letter from Gary Perkins, Chief of Washington, D.C. Mission of UNHCR, to
Doris Meissner, Acting INS Commissioner (Oct. 27, 1981) (need for thorough interview to
prevent such return) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law). See also W. Wood-
ward, Haitian Migration Interdiction Operation 17-18 (unpublished House Coast Guard Sub-
comm. Staff Report on Study Mission to Haiti, Jan. 7-12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Woodward Report] (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law) Mr. Woodward ob-
served the second interdiction, on Jan. 10, 1982. He reported that each interview, conducted
through a Creole translator, lasted only one to two minutes. Id. at 19-20.
138. See Exchange of Letters, supra note 89, at 2. After the first two interdictions, return-
ees were not met by officials of the Haitian Red Cross, which has close ties to government
authorities and the Duvalier family. See Woodward Report, supra note 137, at 21; Hooper
Interview, supra note 29.
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to the inadequacy of hearing procedures on board the boat, are returned
to Haiti, may face the persecution they sought to escape. Those who left
Haiti solely or primarily for economic reasons may be persecuted by the
Haitian government for insulting or embarrassing the government by
leaving the country. 139 The United States recognizes that if economically
motivated migrants, who face harsh punishment because the Haitian
government treats their departure as a political act, qualify as refugees
even if they did not originally leave Haiti due to a fear of persecution. 140
If either type of returnee is likely to be persecuted, the United States
violates the principle of non-refoulement by returning them to Haiti.
Past experience calls into question Haitian government assurances that
returnees will not be persecuted. A UNHCR official has counseled that
"[p]rudence argues against UNHCR acceptance, at face value, [of] the
Haitian government's undertaking that no forcibly returned person shall
be subject to persecution."1 4 1 Even if President Duvalier tempers the be-
havior of the national government in recognition of the fact that United
States aid to Haiti may depend on respect for human rights, 142 this does
not restrain abuses by local Tonton Macoutes officials.143 Moreover, ef-
fective monitoring of abuses of returnees' rights has proven impossible by
groups within Haiti. 44
The Reagan Administration defends the interdiction program, in part,
by claiming that the United States monitors returnees in Haiti to ensure
that they are not mistreated.145 While the INS has assured the UNHCR
139. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (persecution of returnees despite assur-
ances that they would not be harmed; standing orders for Macoutes to arrest and imprison all
returnees from the United States). See also NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, supra note
32, at 18 (disappearances of returnees).
140. See T. Olson, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Interpretation of the
Refugee Act of 1980 (Aug. 24, 1981) (Memorandum for David W. Crosland, General Counsel,
INS) [hereinafter cited as Olson, Refugee Act Memorandum], reprinted in U.S. Refugee Pro-
gram: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Refugee Program Hearings].
141. Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, at 3-4.
142. Under section 721 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1982), certain funds and credits may be expended for Haiti only if the
President determines that the Haitian government is cooperating in acting against illegal emi-
gration, and in implementing U.S. development assistance programs and "is not engaged in a
pattern of gross violations" of human rights. Id. Duvalier appears to have recognized this, at
least on occasion. See Hooper Interview, supra note 29 (noting Haitian government action
against human rights abuses in the capital, Port-au-Prince).
143. The law in the countryside is defined by the local Tonton Macoutes, in part because
of the lack of an adequate legal system in Haiti. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
144. The Haitian League for Human Rights, an independent group, has in the past been a
target of continued harassment and violence. See M. Hooper, Critique of the State Depart-
ment Report on Human Rights Practices in Haiti for 1980, supra note 4.
145. 1982 Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 25, at 191 (testimony of Rudolph W. Giuliani,
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that the State Department would monitor returnees, 146 the practicalities
of Haitian life and geography, and the failure of the U.S. Embassy in
Port-au-Prince to regard this monitoring as a priority, make effective en-
forcement unlikely. 147 Even if enforcement were a high priority, fre-
quent monitoring would be time-consuming and difficult because most of
the migrants are from small towns far from Port-au-Prince. 148 Further-
more, official monitoring efforts are unlikely to be effective in discovering
abuses because the returnees' fear of reprisals by authorities will deter
them from confiding in U.S. officials, who may be perceived as collabo-
rating with the Haitian authorities. 149
The State Department did conduct a follow-up on sixteen returnees
from the first interdicted vessel and found no complaints of mistreat-
ment.1 50 The National Council of Churches, however, has claimed that
six or seven of this group disappeared.151 The Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights tried to monitor five returnees from that
vessel on three separate occasions, but was unsuccessful. 152 Those ques-
tioned at the addresses of three of the returnees refused to admit any
knowledge of them; while those at the addresses of the other two admit-
ted knowing the returnees, they said that the returnees were not living
there. 153 In all five cases, those questioned asserted that State Depart-
ment personnel had never contacted them regarding the whereabouts or
treatment of the returnees.
54
U.S. legal officials acknowledge the necesity of individual determina-
tions of refugee status, recognizing that a country may produce political
refugees as well as economic migrants, and that examiners must distin-
guish between the two groups to comport with both international and
domestic legal obligations.155 Nonetheless, both the INS and the State
Department have maintained the position that the Haitians as a class are
economic migrants not meeting the definition of refugee under the Con-
Associate Attorney General, that he was made more comfortable in sending interdicted mi-
grants back to Haiti by the U.S. ability to monitor returnees).
146. Meissner letter, supra note 104, at 2.
147. Woodward Interview, supra note 29 (based on conversations with U.S. Embassy
staff).
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 1-6 & 134-35.
150. Mabry Statement, supra note 130, at 4. An expert on Haiti dismissed the State De-
partment monitoring as ineffective but conceded that if widespread persecution of returnees
were occurring, some word of it would probably have reached the State Department in Port-
au-Prince. Hooper Interview, supra note 29.
151. Mabry, supra note 130, at 4.
152. Hooper Interview, supra note 29.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Olson, Refugee Act Memorandum, supra note 140, at 30.
172
Vol. 10: 151, 1984
Interdiction of Haitian Migrants
vention or the INA.15 6
Despite U.S. claims to the contrary, 157 the UNHCR has denied that it
ever concluded that "'generally' the mass of Haitians seeking asylum
were economic refugees." 158  A UNHCR official, discussing United
States assurances that bona fide refugees would not be returned to Haiti
from an interdicted vessel, stated that "[t]hese assurances, however, can
hardly be viewed as convincing when one considers that, in spite of the
fact of persistent and continuing reports of gross violations of human
rights in Haiti, only a handful of Haitians, during the past few years have
so far been granted asylum in the U.S."159
The administration's position that the Haitians are economic migrants
not qualifying for refugee status ignores the considerable difficulty in dis-
tinguishing economics from politics in Haiti. 160 This makes it likely that'
some interdicted Haitians who are bona fide refugees will be returned to
Haiti in violation of the Protocol.
B. The Principle of First Asylum
In the past the United States has been a leader in promoting the inter-
national principle of first asylum to ensure the protection of individual
human fights. 161 The principle of first asylum provides that where there
is a large-scale influx into a neighboring state,162 as in the Haitian case,
the migrants should be admitted without discrimination and provided at
least temporary shelter and protection, even if the neighboring state can-
156. See McHugh & Masanz, Interdiction of Haitian Vessels on the High Seas 4 (Cong.
Research Service, Library of Cong., Nov. 2, 1981); Foreign Affairs Staff Report, supra note
113, at 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A14, col. 1. See also Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
676 F.2d at 1030-31 (describing 1978 "Haitian Program," states that INS "advised in absolute
terms that the Haitians were 'economic' and not 'political refugees;' in accordance with that
position, the tally sheet for recording asylum determinations had no column for applications
granted").
157. See Foreign Affairs Staff Report, supra note 113.
158. Letter from Klaus Feldman of UNHCR to Ira Gollobin (Nov. 29, 1979), quoted in
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, supra note 32, at 13. UNHCR support for a determina-
tion of refugee status on a class basis is unlikely given its stress on individual determinations.
See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 123.
159. Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, at 9.
160. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at BIl, col. 1 ("To Haitians, there is no line
between economics and politics.").
161. See, e.g., DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1979, at 38-39 (former Secretary of State Vance's
statement and news conference stressing "my government's strong support for the internation-
ally recognized principle of temporary shelter and asylum" and stating that first asylum "is a
fundamental principle, a principle which I have said many times, that we deeply believe in, and
it will continue to be part of our policy.") [hereinafter cited as Vance Statement].
162. Indeed, most persons seeking asylum do flee to neighboring states. For example,
many Vietnamese boat people fled to ASEAN states, China, and Hong Kong, many
Kampucheans fled across the border into Thailand, and most Africans generally seek asylum
within the African continent. A. GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 46, at 103-05, 107.
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not admit them on a permanent basis.1 63 While first asylum is not a
customary legal norm, and no international obligation to afford it exists,
it remains important for the United States to uphold the principle both to
encourage its broader acceptance and to demonstrate the U.S. commit-
ment to human rights.' 64
Interdiction directly contravenes the principle of first asylum, impair-
ing the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to promote observance of individual
human rights by other nations and impeding the development of first
asylum as an international legal norm.
1 65
V. Analysis of the Interdiction Program Under United States Law
A. Due Process
Congress enjoys plenary power in the area of immigration.166 Accord-
ingly, the Protocol is not a source of rights under United States law ex-
cept insofar as Congress implements it.167 In the Refugee Act of 1980,
Congress implemented the provision on non-refoulement of the Conven-
tion (Article 33) and the definition of "refugee" in the Protocol.168
163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a definition of the principle of first
asylum.
164. The Task Force which first proposed interdiction as part of an immigration program
did note its potential adverse impact both on the worldwide refugee situation and on U.S.
"credibility" as a promoter of human rights. Task Force Memorandum, supra note 22, at 6, 9
(possible adverse reaction at home and abroad; interdiction "could set an international prece-
dent for turning away 'boat people' seeking asylum in, e.g., Southeast Asia." See also Wash.
Post, July 31, 1981, at Al (statement of civil rights attorney Dale F. Swartz that interdiction
would "give a green light" to Asian countries to turn away Indochinese boat people). Only
slightly more than a year before the interdiction program began, the Carter Administration
had condemned such a practice and exhorted the ASEAN states to respect first asylum and
provide temporary refuge, despite the major problems this could cause for these countries.
Vance Statement, supra note 161, at 35. See e.g., A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 46, at 104
for a description of the impact of a refugee influx on social services, community, etc. in
Malaysia.
165. See Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 694 (testimony of Bishop
Anthony J. Bevilacqua, Chairman, Ad Hoc Comm. on Migration and Tourism, National Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, expressing fears of adverse impact of U.S. interdiction policy,
particularly regarding countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia). See also id. at 593-95 (ques-
tions and statements by Rep. Frank, quoting the Bevilacqua statement and expressing concern
about the negative example for Southeast Asia and damage to the U.S. image as protector of
human rights). A UNHCR official also expressed concern that the interdiction program sets a
negative precedent for "other refugee-intake countries, especially those confronted with large
influxes of refugees but, unlike the U.S., with weak economies and fragile political structures."
Kalumiya Memorandum, supra note 53, at 2. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A34, col. 1
(editorial noting deleterious effect of interdiction policy on U.S. reputation).
166. For modem Supreme Court affirmations of this power, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
167. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (Protocol affords no rights
not provided under domestic law).
168. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 108 (1980). See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (INA § 243(h) amended in accordance with language
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By amending the INA in 1980, Congress provided both excludable and
deportable aliens a statutory right to apply for asylum at a meaningful
time and place.169 Although Congress is empowered to distinguish
among aliens on the basis of race or national origin170 and between ex-
cludable and deportable aliens, 171 it explicitly chose not to do so in its
asylum procedures.
The executive branch cannot ignore a statutory directive mandating a
single asylum procedure by implementing different procedures for ex-
cludable and deportable aliens or for aliens of different nationalities or
races.172 The procedures provided by Congress constitute due process
for the alien seeking admission to the United States.1 73 The procedures
established pursuant to section 208(a) of the INA therefore comprise the
process due an excludable alien applying for asylum, and the procedures
established pursuant to section 236 of the INA constitute due process for
the denial of admission to the United States. By failing to provide coun-
sel, the right of appeal, and other procedures established pursuant to sec-
tion 208, the interdiction program does not comply with the due process
provided by Congress for the handling of exclusion and asylum claims. 174
of Protocol and to be construed consistently therewith); H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 61, at
17 (Refugee Act conforms U.S. statutory law to obligations under Protocol in provisions on
asylum, INA § 208, and withholding of deportation, INA § 243(h)).
169. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1039-40. This case dealt with de-
portable aliens, holding that the INS Haitian Program denied Haitian asylum applicants due
process of law, but its conclusion logically applies as well to excludable aliens because Con-
gress instructed the Attorney General to provide a single application procedure for both cate-
gories of alien.
170. See Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 212 n. 12.
171. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The premise of non-discrimination is at
the core of the Refugee Act of 1980. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 61, at 13.
172. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (neutral statute must not be ap-
plied to discriminate on the basis of race), citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886); Bertrand, 684 F.2d at 212 n. 12 (in the absence of legislative policy, an immigration
officer is not permitted to apply neutral regulations to discriminate on the basis of race or
national origin).
173. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), quoting United
States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (applying this analysis to restrict
rights of aliens).
174. Non-compliance with due process must, of course, be assessed in light of the recent
decisions in Jean, 727 F.2d 957 and Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396
(D.D.C. 1985), which held that the excludable aliens were entitled to no Fifth Amendment
protections. The author views these cases as having been wrongly decided, and as ignoring the
purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980. In Gracey Judge Richey purports to find a clear concur-
rence between the executive and legislative branches on the subject of interdiction, citing (1)
the grant of statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(7) (permitting suspension
of entry of aliens if the President finds it "would be detrimental to the interests" of the United
States), (2) approval of the interdiction program by the Senate Committee on Appropriations
(which provided funding), and (3) the conditioning of foreign aid credits on cooperation "in
halting illegal emigration." Id. at 1399-1400. The Gracey decision further rests on the finding
that due process analysis is inapplicable in the interdiction context. Absent this conclusion,
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One administration response to criticism of the interdiction program
might be that the only Haitians returned are those who failed to express a
basis for asylum or a desire to apply for asylum, and that, therefore, the
provisions of section 208(a) do not apply to them. This argument has two
flaws. First, the conditions of the interview on board the boat probably
would deter most Haitians with bona fide asylum claims from asserting
them.175 Second, potential asylees should be informed of their right to
apply for asylum. The Supreme Court has ruled that failire to provide
notice of the existence of a right constitutes a violation of that right,
particularly when the intended beneficiaries are too uneducated or inex-
perienced to inform themselves. 176 This suggests that the INS's failure to
inform interdicted Haitians of their right to apply for asylum violates
that right. 177
Another difficult issue for those challenging the legality of the interdic-
tion procedures is whether Haitians on the high seas qualify for section
208 protection even though they are neither "physically present" nor "at
a land border or port of entry."178 If section 208 does not apply, the
executive branch is technically free to follow whatever procedures it
deems appropriate for determining refugee status in the context of an
interdiction. The Reagan Administration accordingly has argued against
the applicability of the INA exclusion and asylum provisions on the
ground that interdiction takes place on the high seas.
179
In enacting the Refugee Act, Congress arguably intended either that
no determinations of exclusion or asylum be made on the high seas or
that such determinations be made in conformity with INA procedures.
The Act evidences an intent to treat all asylum applicants equally, basing
asylum determinations on individual merit rather than national origin or
other political considerations.1 80 One federal court, in discussing the
purpose of the Refugee Act, stated: "[w]e believe Congress' sympathy to
the plight of refugees such as the 'boat people' is relevant. The general
which has been challenged elsewhere in this Article, interdiction would have to conform with
the requirements of § 208.
175. See supra notes 128-137 and accompanying text.
176. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.15 (1978).
177. While Nunez v. Boldsin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Tex. 1978) dismissed, 692 F.2d
755 (5th Cir. 1978), referred to such a right, excludable aliens were held to lack such a right in
Jean, 727 F.2d 957. The Supreme Court's decision in Jean is likely to clarify this matter.
178. See INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981).
179. See Olson, Interdiction Memorandum, supra note 121, at 2. Judge Richey accepted
this contention in dismissing Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1406, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because, "the interdiction program complained of occurs on the
high seas, outside the United States....
180. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 61, at 13.
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purpose of the Act is to regularize, not hinder, their entry." 181 This
statement suggests that Congress did not intend to allow the executive
branch to circumvent a uniform asylum procedure by interdicting aliens
on the high seas and preventing them from reaching the border where the
congressionally-mandated procedures would apply.' 82
Furthermore, the regulations implementing section 207 of the INA
demonstrate that the Act is intended to apply to refugee applicants in
other countries, not on the high seas. 183 If section 208 procedures are
inapplicable, then no provision exists for an asylum application proce-
dure on the high seas. Congress, however, intended to implement the
Protocol, which requires the establishment of effective procedures for ref-
ugee determinations.18 4 This reasoning suggests either that Congress in-
tended that there be no asylum determinations on the high seas or that
the procedures under section 208 be employed.
The administration's response to these arguments is that Congress au-
thorized the executive branch to order interdiction on the high seas and
to develop its own procedures for exclusion and asylum under section
212(f) of the INA and, therefore, that the interdiction program imple-
ments rather than circumvents the INA. 185 The administration further
asserts that, at least where Congress has not acted, the executive has in-
herent authority to exclude aliens as a fundamental act of sovereignty.
1 86
Several arguments counter the administration's claim of authority
under section 212(1). First, although the Reagan Administration now
bases its authority for the interdiction program on existing law, the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which first pro-
posed an interdiction policy, apparently believed that new enabling
181. Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S.Ct. 2489
(1984).
182. While the arguments for congressional toleration of interdiction put forward in
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1399-1400, are significant, see supra note 174, they do not show actual
legislative approval of the program.
183. See 8 C.F.R. § 207 (1982). § 207.1(a), for example, provides that an alien may apply
for admission as a refugee by filing a form with the overseas INS officer responsible for the area
where the applicant is located.
184. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text for an argument that the Protocol,
while leaving the particular procedure up to individual states, requires states to adopt some
effective procedure, and see supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text, for an argument that
the U.S. interdiction procedures are ineffective in separating out bona fide refugees.
185. See Olson, Interdiction Memorandum, supra note 121, for a discussion of the Reagan
Administration claims of authority under the INA. Judge Richey's recent decision in Gracey,
600 F. Supp. at 1399, emphasized this legislative authorization under § 212(0, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(0, citing it as proof of Congress's approval of the interdiction program.
186. Id. at 4. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 542-43 (1950), and subsequent cases support this
claim of executive discretion absent any legislative action.
177
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legislation was necessary to authorize interdiction. 187 The administra-
tion implemented the interdiction policy and subsequently introduced
legislation that would have amended the INA to provide explicit author-
ity for the President to order the interdiction of undocumented aliens on
the high seas.' 88
Authority under section 212(f) to suspend entry of aliens as immi-
grants or non-immigrants may not apply to refugees. Refugees were not
defined in the 1952 Act in which 212(f) first appeared;1 89 Congress's spe-
cial treatment of refugees in the Refugee Act of 1980 suggests an intent
to establish a third class, separate from the classes of immigrants and
non-immigrants as defined in section 101(a)(15) of the INA.190
The Reagan Administration itself admitted that, to the best of its
knowledge, no other President had ever invoked section 212(f).191 This
suggests that Congress may not have considered the possible use of sec-
tion 212(f) in an interdiction context when it amended the INA in 1980.
Earlier sections of the INA must be construed consistently with provi-
sions adopted at a later date. Congress provided for implementation of
the Protocol in section 208; a construction of section 212(f) consistent
with section 208 would preclude use of the former to avoid the section
208 procedures.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether authority to "suspend the entry of"
aliens192 necessarily includes authority to return aliens to the country
from which they came. As used in the INA, "entry" generally means
187. In describing a proposed policy of interdiction at sea, the Final Report of the Presi-
dent's Task Force stated that "the Administration would seek legislation to authorize the Pres-
ident to direct the Coast Guard to assist foreign governments that request such assistance to
interdict on the high seas their flag vessels suspected of attempting to violate U.S. law." Final
Report of the President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy 7 [hereinafter cited
as Task Force Report], accompanying Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for the
President from the Attorney General (June 26, 1981).
188. H.R. 4832/S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), Title X (the Emergency Interdiction
Act). This part of the immigration program was not included in the legislation introduced by
Sen. Simpson and Rep. Mazzoli in the next three sessions.
189. The definition of refugee in INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981)
was added by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 108 (1980).
190. In addition to adding the definition of a refugee, see id., Congress in 1980 added new
sections to the INA for refugee admissions and application for asylum independent of the
existing provisions for dealing with excludable and deportable aliens, normal immigrant ad-
missions, and admissions of the special classes of non-immigrants listed in INA § 101(a)(15), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1981). Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 108
(1980), adding INA §§ 207, 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1158 (Supp. V 1981). All of these aided in
bringing the United States into greater conformity with the Protocol, which entered into force
for this country in 1968.
191. Olson, Interdiction Memorandum, supra note 121, at 3 n. 5 ("Neither this Office nor
INS is aware of any time when the power granted by this section, added in 1952, has been
used.").
192. INA § 212(0, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(0 (1981).
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legal entry rather than mere physical entry. An alien may be physically
present in the United States, either in INS detention or on parole pending
exclusion or asylum proceedings, without having made "entry" or being
present in the legal sense. 193 Section 212(f) could be read to allow the
President to suspend legal entry without being able to circumvent the
exclusion and asylum procedures of the INA by suspending physical en-
try and returning the aliens. 1
94
Finally, the Reagan Administration's implementation of the interdic-
tion program under procedures that do not comply with the procedures
established pursuant to section 208 conflicts with the congressional intent
to provide a single, uniform asylum procedure for all applicants. The
administration has argued that when Congress established asylum proce-
dures under the Refugee Act, it did not anticipate the impending influx
of asylum seekers from Cuba in the Mariel boatlift or that the multiple
layers of appeals provided by the Act would cripple the asylum determi-
nation system. 195 Accordingly, the administration introduced legislation
to reform asylum adjudication by expediting asylum and exclusion pro-
ceedings. 196 Whatever the shortcomings of such legislation, requesting
Congress to amend these procedures was at least a proper means to effect
change.
Given the political imperatives of the situation, 197 however, the admin-
istration chose not to wait for Congress to change the exclusion and asy-
lum procedures, and implemented the interdiction program with
procedures substantially different from those provided under the INA.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the political branches need to be
able to respond flexibly to changing international conditions with revised
immigration policies, 198 and that this might justify the executive branch's
authorization of procedures that differ from those provided by Congress,
especially if a particular situation is not explicitly covered by INA provi-
193. Comment, supra note 54, at 196-99 (aliens paroled into the United States are not
legally present and have not entered).
194. It might be responsed that section 212(f) does allow suspension ofphysical entry (and
the subsequent return of the aliens), consistent with the exclusion and asylum provisions of the
INA, if this is necessary because parole or detention proved insufficient to protect against the
detrimental effects of mass entry.
195. See Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 2, at 579 (prepared statement of Alan
C. Nelson, Deputy Commissioner, INS); 1981 Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 22, at 13-14
(testimony of David C. Hiller, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Dep't of Justice).
196. H.R. 4832/S.1765, supra note 188.
197. See Task Force Memorandum, supra note 22, at 7, describing the political urgency of
the situation in Florida: "Continuing arrivals of Haitians without rapid deportation is viewed
by Florida as a non-enforcement policy that causes serious adverse impact. Governor Graham
appears prepared to capitalize on the circumstances. Senator Hawkins is placed in a difficult
situation."
198. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
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sions. However, the substantive policies should still be reasonably calcu-
lated to satisfy U.S. obligations under the Protocol, as incorporated by
domestic legislation.
The interdiction procedures, by providing inadequate means of screen-
ing out bona fide refugees, do not comport with U.S. obligations and the
Haitians' right to apply for asylum. At a minimum, the interdiction pro-
gram circumvents congressionally-mandated procedures and the legisla-
tive intent to provide a uniform asylum procedure. It also violates the
spirit of the Refugee Act, which calls for determinations of refugee status
on the basis of individual merit. For these reasons, the Reagan Adminis-
tration should suspend the interdiction program pending explicit legisla-
tive authorization.1 99
B. Extradition Law
The Executive Order and the Exchange of Letters contemplate the in-
terdiction and return of vessels engaged in violating "appropriate" Hai-
tian laws, which probably means Haitian emigration laws.2°° At least in
the early interdictions of Haitian vessels, the Coast Guard claimed to be
acting under its authority to enforce appropriate Haitian, not U.S.
laws. 201
The President's power to enforce Haitian laws by extraditing Haitian
refugees under the Executive Order and the Exchange of Letters is, how-
ever, of questionable legality. As precedent for its claimed authority to
enforce the laws of a foreign country the administration has cited an
1891 agreement between the United States and Great Britain.202 This
agreement prohibited seal killing in a section of the Behring Sea and au-
199. Congress shows no sign of providing such explicit authority. No version of the Ad-
ministration's Emergency Interdiction Act, Title X of H.R. 4832 and S.1765, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1981), was included in the substitute legislation introduced by Sen. Simpson and Rep.
Mazzoli. H.R. 5872/S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 1510/S.529, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess. (1983). The fact that Congress has not so acted would appear to undermine Judge
Richey's analysis of legislative approval in Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1399-1400, see supra note
174. At the same time, the fact that Simpson-Mazzoli has not yet become law indicates the
inherent problems in seeking explicit statutory authority for specific items such as interdiction
through a comprehensive immigration bill.
200. Exec. Order, supra note 86, at 48, 109; Exchange of Letters, supra note 89, at 2. The
only specific references that the author found concerning what Haitian laws qualify as "appro-
priate" were references to "travel laws" and "emigration laws." See also Olson, Interdiction
Memorandum, supra note 121.
201. See Woodward Report, supra note 137, at 19.
202. Modus Vivendi Respecting the Fur-Seal Fisheries in Behring Sea (1891), 1 W. MAL-
LOY, TREATIEs, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BE-
TWEEN THE UNrrED STATES AND OTHER POWERS 1176-1909, at 743 (1910); see Olson,




Interdiction of Haitian Migrants
thorized United States and British officials to apprehend violators from
either country outside the territorial limits of the United States and to
turn them over to their own government.
The 1891 agreement is a questionable precedent for enforcing Haitian
emigration laws through interdiction for several reasons. That agree-
ment was more limited in scope than the interdiction agreement and was
adopted for different purposes. Moreover, it created the prohibition
which it then authorized the countries to enforce, whereas Haitian emi-
gration laws predated the United States-Haiti interdiction agreement. 203
The proscribed killing of seals took place on the high seas, whereas the
violation of Haitian emigration laws actually occurs as Haitians set sail
from Haiti, within the territory of the country whose law is being en-
forced. United States extradition laws are more clearly applicable to
crimes occurring in foreign territory.2 4 Most important, the 1891 agree-
ment was adopted before the Supreme Court interpreted extradition law
to require explicit treaty or statutory authorization for the Executive to
return a person wanted for foreign crimes to a foreign country.205
The Supreme Court discussed United States extradition law at length
in Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, concluding that "albeit a
national power. . .[extradition power] is not confided to the Executive
in the absence of treaty or legislative provisions" 20 6 and that this rule
rests upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution creates no
executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceed-
ings against him must be authorized by law. There is no executive discre-
tion to surrender him to a foreign government, unless that discretion is
granted by law. It necessarily follows that as the legal authority does not
exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, it is
not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It
must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.20 7
203. Furthermore, the Fur-Seal agreement was designed to last less than a year, whereas
the interdiction program's duration is indefinite; the former was adopted as a stop-gap mea-
sure, pending agreement on a congressionally-ratified arbitration convention (adopted eight
months later), to avoid clashes between U.S. and British seal fishers claiming conflicting rights
in the Behring Sea. 1 W. MALLOY, supra note 202, at 743.
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1981) (chapter concerning extradition relates to "surrender of
persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries.").
205. Valentine v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
206. Id. at 9.
207. Id. Although Valentine involved a request for surrender of an American citizen, the
Court made clear that its rule applies to any person, not only to a citizen. Id. at 10. See also
Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 520 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972) (rec-
ognizing and following the rule in Valentine); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957) (Executive is without inherent extradition power, cit-
ing Valentine). See generally Blakesley, Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern
France and United State: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 39 (1981) (discuss-
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The Reagan Administration, therefore, may lawfully return Haitians for
suspected violations of Haitian law only if Congress has authorized such
action in a specific statute or treaty.
Congress has not approved either the Executive Order or the Ex-
change of Letters. The United States is a party to a duly ratified bilateral
treaty of extradition with Haiti, 20° which authorizes extradition only for
specific enumerated crimes.209 Violation of emigration laws is not one of
the specific crimes listed. The treaty also provides that extradition is not
authorized for offenses of a "political character. '210 The extradition
treaty therefore does not authorize the Reagan Administration to return
bona fide political refugees for violating Haitian emigration laws.211
President Reagan has also claimed the authority to assist Haiti in the
enforcement of its emigration laws under his foreign relations power, and
under the power delegated by Congress to the President (through the
Attorney General) to guard U.S. borders against the illegal entry of
aliens.212 It is doubtful that this statutory grant of authority is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of statutory authorization for extradition, since
enforcement of Haitian laws would not seem to be necessary to fulfill this
duty.
VI. Conclusions and Proposals for Change
As formulated and applied, the interdiction program Violates interna-
tional and domestic law, sets a negative precedent for world-wide refugee
protection, and does not provide an effective solution to United States
immigration problems. It should, therefore, be terminated.
ing development of extradition law and practice in United States and France and analyzing the
issue of whether or not extradition is permitted in the absence of a treaty obligation).
208. Extradition Treaty, Aug. 9, 1904, United States-Haiti, T.S. No. 447, 34 Stat. 2858,
reprinted in I EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIEs-UNrrED STATES 360.1 (I. Kavass & A.
Sprudz eds. 1979).
209. Id. at arts. I, II. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1981) (extradition authorized only for
crimes provided in specific treaty). U.S. extradition statutes also specify several procedures
that the government must satisfy before extraditing any person. These include a hearing
before a magistrate or judge, held publicly and on land. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3189 (1981). The
interdiction procedures satisfy none of these.
210. Extradition Treaty, supra note 208, at art. VII.
211. See Blakesley, supra note 207, at 57 (quoting note to Turkish Ambassador from U.S.
Secretary of State Herter in 1959 that the government "may not extradite an individual to a
foreign country in the absence of such an [extradition] agreement or in a case not coming
within the terms of such agreement."). Of course, it may be argued that the extradition treaty
and the statute do not provide relief because they are inapplicable to activities on the high seas,
as Judge Richey held in Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1406. For a response to this contention, see
supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
212. INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1981); see also Olson, Interdiction Memorandum,
supra note 121, at 6.
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An appropriate response to the breakdown in the system of processing
asylum applications is to reform the system to expedite the process while
still ensuring fairness for all applicants. To date, proposed reforms in-
cluded in the Simpson-Mazzoli immigration legislation have gained sup-
port in both houses of Congress but have not been enacted into law.213
The Simpson-Mazzoli legislation is comprehensive but does not address
interdiction.214 Whatever the merits of particular aspects of the proposed
legislation, as a congressional determination of how to deal with the per-
ceived administrative backlog it is preferable to interdiction ordered
solely by the President.
215
In addition to reforming procedures governing asylum applications,
the United States should punish those who smuggle refugees into the
country rather than penalize the refugees themselves.216 Despite agree-
ment in the Exchange of Letters and in public pledges to act against
smugglers,217 actual U.S. and Haitian efforts in this regard have been
minimal, enabling smugglers to operate with impunity in both
countries.21
8
The interdiction program discards the entire congressionally-man-
dated process for one group of potential asylum applicants, the Haitians,
and replaces it with procedures that are both unlawful and unwise. The
interdiction program evades procedural protections under domestic law
and exploits ambiguities in the definition of a refugee under international
213. Simpson-Mazzoli, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, H.R. 1510/
S.529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. passed the Senate in May 1983 and the House in June 1984, but
the legislation died in conference when Congress adjourned October 11, 1984.
214. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 187-96 and 205-07 and accompanying text.
216. The United States has the authority and the duty under current law to prosecute
smugglers of undocumented aliens. See INA § 215(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(2) (1981) (illegal
to transport persons into United States with knowledge that their entry is illegal); INA § 273,
8 U.S.C. § 1323 (1981) ($1000 fine for bringing visaless alien to the United States), INA
§§ 274, 275, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1325 (1981) (felony and misdemeanor to bring in and harbor
illegal aliens); INA § 279, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1981) (jurisdiction of federal district court; Attor-
ney General's duty to prosecute).
217. See Exchange of Letters, supra note 89, at 2-3, for the agreement to act against
smugglers.
218. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A14, col. I (traffickers as targets of interdiction
program). The owner of the Exoribe, the first vessel interdicted carrying migrants, apparently
boarded a plane in Haiti the day after the interdiction and flew to Miami, where he dis-
embarked with a valid visa, despite the Haitian government's knowledge that he was a major
smuggler; he apparently has not be prosecuted in either country. Woodward Interview, supra
note 29; while there has been some U.S. action, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1981, at A7, col. 6
(U.S. indictment of Haitian smugglers in case involving murder and privation of Haitian mi-
grants who died on board boat en route to United States in July 1981), the Haitian government
has done little. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A14, col. 1 (reporting statement of U.S.
Ambassador Preeg, that Haitian government had taken no action against smugglers in the
past).
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law. Although those interdicted on the high seas might best be character-
ized within a separate category of "would-be" refugees, their return nev-
ertheless conflicts with the international principle of non-refoulement.
The Reagan Administration should abandon the interdiction program.
Instead it should focus its efforts on developing ways to resolve the refu-
gee crisis that are consistent with U.S. and international law21 9 while re-
maining sensitive to the United States' leadership role in the development
of international protections for refugees.
219. These efforts might include, but certainly would not be limited to, requiring improve-
ments in the Haitian human rights record in exchange for U.S. aid (i.e. genuinely enforcing
existing conditions on aid, see supra note 142), improving efforts to stop smuggling operations,
and supporting legislation that would streamline immigration procedures without discriminat-
ing against any single nationality.
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